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The kind of security problems states will face in the twenty-first 
century are more likely to be about managing cooperation than 
triumphing through conflict. 
                                                                             PHILLIP BOBBITT
Planned Track or Drift into Danger?
Peril on the Sea
As two great powers that will influence much of the immediate future of our small and vulnerable planet, China and the United States are in a marriage of sorts—
“united for the purpose of living together,” in the words of the Oxford English Diction-
ary.1 Like it or not, the two societies depend on each other. Environmental degradation, 
social unrest, economic problems, or pandemic outbreak in one must inevitably affect 
the other. Both must be active contributors to a peaceful, prosperous, sustainable, global 
community. Both governments emphasize their commitment to a positive and construc-
tive mutual engagement. 
At sea, however, that engagement is not always trouble free. Confrontation happens—
and when it does, events do not always unfold in the way that policy makers might 
have intended or preferred. Like a married couple, both sides prefer to downplay to the 
outside world the extent and nature of quarrels. But despite this public posture, those in 
command of naval and maritime air forces understand only too well the potential risks 
of damage, injury, and even death at the tactical level. More worrying is the inherent risk 
of unintended consequences and the potential for an uncontrolled strategic-political 
spiral of unwanted escalation. It is bad policy and in no one’s interest to perpetuate a 
relationship in which an innocent mistake at sea can trigger an unwanted political crisis.
The maritime relationship between China and the United States is a vital element in 
their relationship and a strategic concern for other states. Their tactical-level interaction 
at sea is too complex to be governed solely by legal arrangements and political postures. 
It is too important to be conducted on-scene by best guesses about each other’s inten-
tions, especially when things get exciting and the testosterone and adrenaline start  
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flowing. And when things do go wrong, the resulting political fallout can be too serious 
to be addressed by rhetoric and dogmatic adherence to rigid positions. Interactions at 
sea are inherently fluid and must be managed mutually, responsibly, and predictably. 
At the moment, the maritime relationship between China and the United States is not 
working as effectively as it should—or must. The business of government is to manage 
events and minimize risk, so no political leadership should be satisfied with a situation 
in which an honest misjudgment or accident at sea can result in an unwanted interna-
tional political problem at an inopportune time. 
Existing Arrangements
In 1998, the two governments concluded an agreement between their defense depart-
ments “establishing a consultation mechanism to strengthen military maritime safety,” 
a document colloquially known as the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement 
(MMCA).2 But three years later, in good flying weather on a pleasant April day in 2001, 
what should have been a routine Chinese interception of an American reconnaissance 
aircraft went tragically wrong. A Chinese F-8 interceptor and a U.S. Navy EP-3 electronic 
surveillance aircraft collided over the South China Sea. The American aircraft made an 
emergency landing at the Lingshui air base in Hainan, resulting in considerable diplo-
matic and intelligence embarrassment. Tragically, the Chinese aircraft crashed, and the 
pilot was killed. In this case at least, the MMCA appears to have made no contribution 
to incident prevention, resolution, or “strengthening military maritime safety.” 
It is highly unlikely that the young pilots of these two aircraft had taken off that morning 
intending to cause a problem for their respective political leaders. It is equally unlikely 
that either government had intended to lose aircraft and people or to create a deliberate 
diplomatic furor. An accident just happened, as accidents do from time to time in the 
complex and demanding environment of modern maritime operations.
Situation Management
If there are no robust arrangements in place to manage such episodes, unintended 
consequences can bring nations to the brink of an unwanted crisis, sometimes to the 
detriment of otherwise carefully crafted political plans and policies. The challenge, 
therefore, is to establish effective situation-management mechanisms to ensure that 
risk is either avoided or managed safely. Even if a government deliberately chooses to 
provoke an incident as an act of national policy, it is still essential that events unfold 
as intended, send clear signals to the other party (or parties), and be managed through 
effective communication mechanisms to bring the situation to the desired—or at least a 
satisfactory—conclusion. There is no point in sending a diplomatic message if it is likely 
to be misunderstood, misinterpreted, or manipulated to advantage by the recipient.
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The Requirement
Since the EP-3/F-8 event, incidents have continued to occur between Chinese and 
American ships and aircraft. So far no one else has died or been injured, but experience 
suggests that it is only a matter of time. Meanwhile, political fallout continues to occur, 
whether or not either government actually intends to provoke the other. In March 2009, 
for example, a running confrontation occurred between the U.S. Naval Ship Impeccable 
(T-AGOS 23) and a number of Chinese vessels—some government craft and some 
apparently private fishing boats. The Chinese reaction included illumination of Impec-
cable’s bridge at night, low-level overflights by a Chinese military aircraft, and close 
maneuvers by civilian-manned trawlers that appear to have been acting under official 
direction. Fortunately, no serious damage occurred, and the only weapons used were 
grappling hooks, searchlights, and fire hoses. Nonetheless, allowing such unstable situa-
tions to evolve rather than managing them cooperatively is imprudent and dangerous.3
One month after the Impeccable affair and eight years to the day after the EP-3/F-8 inci-
dent, the presidents of the United States and China affirmed that they “share a commit-
ment to military-to-military relations and will work for their continued improvement 
and development.” The importance of the maritime aspect of that initiative was under-
lined by a visit by the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations to China for the sixtieth anniver-
sary of the founding of the navy of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army.4 This is a very 
good time to take a critical look at prevailing paradigms, at lessons learned elsewhere, 
and at prospects for a transformative approach to military-to-military relationships at sea.
Paradigms and Policy: Paradigm Traps
A paradigm is a framework with which we interpret events or circumstances;5 it is a filter 
through which we view reality. For almost two thousand years, for example, the prevail-
ing paradigm of astronomical science, at least in the Western world, was that planets 
rotate in concentric circles around a stationary earth in a stately dance of cycles and epi-
cycles. Even when it became clear that this explanation was inadequate, the professional 
astronomical community persisted in struggling to develop increasingly complex “laws” 
of science that would reconcile an increasingly cumbersome accepted framework with 
reality. Finally, in 1543, the Polish astronomer Mikołaj Kopernik (Copernicus) published 
De Revolutionibus Orbium Coelestium (On the Revolution of Heavenly Spheres), in which 
he argued that all the planets, including the earth, rotate around the sun, with the earth 
spinning on its axis daily and the moon circling around it. Adoption of this elegantly 
simple and revolutionary explanation of reality is a vivid example of what the historian 
of science Thomas Kuhn dubbed a “paradigm shift.”6 
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Winning acceptance for paradigm shifts often means struggling against inertia and 
sometimes fierce opposition. In theoretical science there is no pressure to do that quick-
ly. In applied disciplines, however, delay in adopting the paradigm that best explains 
reality can be dangerous. In medicine, for example, clinging to an incorrect assumption 
can cost the life of an individual. In national and international security, clinging to inap-
propriate paradigms can result in conflict that can, in turn, cost the lives of thousands. 
Just as scientific paradigms determine the way researchers approach their work, so too 
social and political paradigms underlie national security thinking. They are the unspo-
ken and often unconscious assumptions on which strategies and plans are based. But as 
any military planner knows, assumptions must be treated as fact for practical planning 
purposes and thus need to be identified explicitly and reviewed constantly. An incorrect 
assumption may invalidate the entire plan. Consequently, those responsible for security 
need to question their own paradigms periodically to ensure that they do not—like pre-
Copernican astronomers—squander time and effort on ever more elaborate attempts to 
squeeze reality into a conceptual straitjacket. 
When a lot of time and effort, not to mention tax dollars and sometimes blood, have 
been invested into a strategy or plan that no longer fits the circumstances, it is not easy 
to discard the fundamental assumptions on which it is based. In 2002, biologist Dun-
can Davidson coined a term for this conceptual paralysis in science—“paradigm trap.”7 
Paradigm traps can occur in the world of security and strategy too, a point that histo-
rian Barbara Tuchman popularized eloquently in her 1984 book The March of Folly.8 
Before developing ways of enhancing the Chinese-U.S. maritime military relationship, 
therefore, it would be prudent to give thought to possible paradigm traps that may be 
inhibiting creative thinking.
Example 1: The Threat of a Rising Sea Power?
There is nothing new in the perception by a dominant state that the rise of a new naval 
power must necessarily result in rivalry and even conflict. More than two thousand years 
ago, the Greek historian (and naval commander) Thucydides reflected on the maritime 
origins of the Peloponnesian War. “What made war inevitable,” he said, “was the growth 
of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta.”9 In modern times, the 
dramatic growth of the Imperial German Navy after 1898, driven by Tirpitz’s ambition 
to create a navy “equally strong as England’s,” triggered a naval arms race that contrib-
uted substantially to worldwide war in 1914. That tipping point was to determine much 
of the confrontational course of international relations throughout the remainder of the 
twentieth century and still affects us in the twenty-first.10 More recently, beginning in 
the 1960s, the expansion of the Soviet Navy from a coastal-defense force to a blue-water 
fleet, coupled with political rhetoric about challenging the prevailing international order, 
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was a clear threat to the United States and its allies. Consequently it is not difficult to 
understand a paradigm within the United States and elsewhere today that perceives a 
traditional threat posed by the evolution of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) 
from a coastal-defense adjunct of the army to a world-class navy with global reach.
From a Chinese perspective, however, the Middle Kingdom is simply resuming its right-
ful historical place in the world, a status that had been disrupted temporarily by its un-
happy relationship with Western maritime powers throughout much of the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries. Contemporary Chinese deployments into the Indian Ocean 
evoke comparisons to the golden age of fifteenth-century Chinese seafaring, when Zheng 
He’s great fleets reached the African coast on diplomatic and trading missions, an effort 
that contrasted starkly with the “European concept of a militant, crusading colonialism 
beyond the necessity of creating a favourable climate for east-west trade.”11 Today, Africa 
is again an arena where comparisons are made between the commercial versus military 
imperatives of Chinese and Euro-Americans, respectively. Chinese engagement is not 
only manifested in investment but also in a large number of businesspeople and work-
ers living and working across the continent. There are reportedly now more Chinese 
residents in Nigeria than there were British at the peak of the colonial era. In contrast, 
unfairly or not, to many foreign observers the flagship of American engagement appears 
to be a military command—U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), headquartered com-
fortably in Germany. A typical American interpretation is that this joint command sends 
“a positive message to Africa that Washington views the African continent as being of 
great strategic interest and should facilitate further American aid, security assistance and 
business involvement in Africa.”12 Elsewhere, however, others worry that this apparent 
military focus suggests that “if it comes to a battle for the world’s diminishing resources, 
the U.S. may fall back on its military might. So wary China is building a substantial 
ocean-going navy.”13 Although China’s long blue-water history has been generally more 
about commerce and diplomacy than war fighting (except during Mongol rule), reassur-
ing words that this will remain true in the twenty-first century are of little comfort un-
less they are consistent with deeds. Nonetheless, it not difficult to understand a Chinese 
paradigm that equates great-power status to a substantial naval force characterized by 
benign intent but global reach.
One of the great pitfalls in applying traditional paradigms to current situations is that 
our world has changed so dramatically in the space of one human lifetime. From the 
days of Athens and Sparta until the mid-twentieth century, interstate rivalries did not 
have to take into account such factors as democratized Internet communication, global-
ized economics, exploding populations, a potentially imploding environment, and the 
capability for nuclear, chemical, or biological catastrophe. There are certainly lessons 
to be learned from the relatively recent Soviet-U.S. superpower experience, but today’s 
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Chinese-U.S. situation is fundamentally different. The former happened under the 
shadow of nuclear “mutually assured destruction” (with its appropriate acronym, MAD). 
Still, many observers today would argue that the difference is not truly fundamental, 
that commercial and financial interdependence suggests a paradigm in which China and 
America now live with the economic equivalent of MAD.14 
If studying the past to derive lessons for the present is an invaluable tool for policy mak-
ers, however, it is also fraught with risk. The United States and China are not just two 
more great powers in the traditional mold. Human nature may not have changed much 
throughout recorded history, but the circumstances of the twenty-first century are inher-
ently different from those of earlier times. It is all too tempting to explore the past with 
a bias toward examples that confirm prevailing orthodoxies. Perhaps one of the more 
enduring lessons of the human saga is in fact that truly significant leaps in progress are 
made by the innovators, not the emulators.
Example 2: A Clash of Civilizations?
A “clash of civilizations” paradigm is often used to bolster arguments that intercultural 
conflict is inevitable—for example, between China and the West. This, unfortunately, 
is an inaccurate, if popular, reading of the thesis. In his influential 1996 book The Clash 
of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, Samuel Huntington suggested a new 
“framework, a paradigm, for viewing global politics.”15 The post–Cold War world, he 
argued, consists of seven or eight major civilizations that would be “the ultimate human 
tribes, and the clash of civilizations is tribal conflict on a global scale.”16 The problem 
with the popularity of this paradigm is that—as so often happens with influential 
books—the title has lodged in public consciousness but the subtleties of its content have 
not. Huntington set out to propose a useful hypothesis, not to predict the inevitable. 
Indeed, the title of his original article in Foreign Affairs, upon which the book was based, 
ended with a question mark—punctuation that has since been, in his own words, “gen-
erally ignored.”17 In fact, Huntington argued that the most important step in mitigating 
and reducing clashes of civilizations is to cultivate the commonalities and strengthen 
“Civilization in the singular.”18 In this he shares the worldviews of other innovative 
thinkers ranging from Marshall McLuhan and his “global village” to Buckminster Fuller 
and his “spaceship earth.” Accordingly, Huntington’s advice is not to prepare for an in-
evitable clash across civilizational fault lines but to nurture a sense of global citizenship 
at the upper end of the loyalty spectrum that runs from family, through community, to 
state or province, to country or nation. The real clash of civilizations, he concludes, is 
between Civilization (with a capital C) and barbarism.19 The “civilizational paradigm” is 
a useful concept and explains much, but the idea that civilizational fault lines must nec-
essarily be a source of conflict rather than an opportunity for progress is a paradigm trap. 
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The relentless growth of population and technology has made all civilizations increas-
ingly interdependent. Natural and medical disasters respect no human boundaries. 
Citizens of the “global village” are increasingly mobile. Sufficiently clever and motivated 
dysfunctional people now have a reasonable chance of obtaining weapons of mass de-
struction that destroy indiscriminately. In such a world, cultivation of at least a minimal 
sense of global citizenship is becoming an imperative for global security. 
The United States and China have much in common when so much of the security 
agenda is driven by a relatively small percentage of bigoted, humorless, misogynistic, 
religion-abusing, criminal zealots. Businesspeople enjoying a drink in Shanghai, young 
women having their nails manicured in trendy Beijing salons, and poor peasant farmers 
in central China are all allies of their American counterparts in Los Angeles, Washington, 
and Mississippi, notwithstanding inevitable disagreements between their governments. 
That warrants mutual engagement, not withdrawal behind tribal or civilizational shields 
and barriers. 
The unfortunate reality is that the United States and China are likely to continue to have 
substantial government-to-government disputes for the foreseeable future. Nonetheless, 
the twenty-first century is too complicated to afford the luxury of clinging to outdated 
security paradigms. It is in the national interest for governments to enable those who are 
entrusted with armed force to find common ground for understanding each other. Only 
then can they manage their maritime interactions professionally, safely, and responsibly. 
There are all kinds of theories to explain the impersonal social or historical forces that 
drive nations into armed confrontation. And yet, as Dr. John Stoessinger concludes from 
the eight case studies in his book Why Nations Go to War, “it was people who actually 
precipitated wars” (his italics).20 Despite what history books usually suggest, leaders 
rarely take that irrevocable step solely as a result of fact-based, dispassionate strategic 
calculation. More often, Stoessinger suggests, “the most important single precipitating 
factor in the outbreak of war is misperception.”21 Hence, security is not about inexorable 
and impersonal civilizational forces. It is about the actions of people—individually, 
in groups, and in government. Misperception about those actors and their actions is a 
mutual enemy of both the United States and China.
Example 3: Security through Superiority?
Security is a fundamental requirement for a normal life, as citizens from Gaza, Baghdad, 
or flooded New Orleans would attest. It is, as Joseph Nye has said, “like oxygen—you 
tend not to notice it until you begin to lose it, but once that occurs there is nothing else 
that you will think about.”22 All too often the prevailing security paradigm is expressed 
solely in terms of armed control—of defenses and barriers, of surveillance and weapons 
systems. The problem with the chimerical goal of guaranteed control over events is that 
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it depends on the certainty of prevailing over adversaries. But even that may not result 
in real and enduring security. Even if it were achievable, more control by one necessar-
ily means less control by the other, and that zero-sum thinking becomes a never-ending 
circle. It was not total military victory in 1945 that transformed Germany and Japan into 
prosperous democracies or laid the groundwork for the European Union. Rather, victory 
created the conditions under which long-term engagement and partnership ultimately 
transformed relationships from enmity to harmonious and peaceful friendship. Unless 
a state genuinely aspires to domination and armed hegemony, a strategy of focusing 
exclusively on armed superiority to control events is a paradigm trap. 
“Security” should not be confused with “defense.” Although the words are often used 
interchangeably, defense is only one element of the security equation. “Defense” is 
defined by most dictionaries as protection or resistance against attack, which is precisely 
what armed capability aims to achieve. “Security,” on the other hand, is what military 
campaign planners would call the “desired end state.” Most dictionaries—in the English 
language, at least—define “security” not in terms of control but by using the word “con-
fidence.” To be secure is to have confidence that one will wake up safely in the morning, 
go about one’s business in peace, and raise one’s family in prosperity and happiness. At 
sea, it means confidence that legitimate trade will flow predictably and unhindered, that 
the sea remains, in Mahan’s famous phrase, a “great common” and not an avenue for 
attack. Maritime security means that the ocean’s resources, on which we all depend, are 
used responsibly and safely and that the life-support system that it represents remains 
functional. 
Of course, armed force is an important and irreplaceable element in security, because 
it is the ultimate guarantor against threats by perverse human beings. As Winston 
Churchill once said, “Virtuous motives, trammeled by inertia and timidity, are no match 
for armed and resolute wickedness.” Nonetheless, military capability is only one ele-
ment in the formula and not the entire answer. Even in an adversarial relationship there 
should be some degree of mutual confidence that each side is a civilized, honorable, and 
rational actor. 
Helen Keller once wrote, “Security is mostly superstition. It does not exist in nature, nor 
do the children of men as a whole experience it.” A true and lasting secure relationship is 
characterized by openness, engagement, and trust. Confidence should, therefore, be the 
core concern of any relationship, especially between representatives of armed forces that 
interact routinely at the tactical level when implementing national security policy.
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Confidence-Building Paradigms
Naval Armament and Arms Control
Salvador de Madariaga famously pointed out that “nations don’t distrust each other 
because they are armed; they are armed because they distrust each other.”23 As long as 
China is resuming its place as one of the world’s major political, economic, and cultural 
powers, it is not going to forgo the development of a world-class, oceangoing navy. As 
long as the United States has the capability to project power into China’s home waters 
and is committed to defend allies who may come into conflict with China, there will be a 
Chinese imperative to aim for some form of materiel and operational parity.
Significant bilateral arms control is not a realistic policy option. In any case, history does 
not suggest much hope that such efforts would be likely to succeed. The disastrous result 
of the naval arms races that preceded the First World War inspired a flurry of naval 
disarmament initiatives during the pause in fighting between the armistice in 1918 and 
resumption of war in 1939. The Washington Conference of 1921–22 is the best-known 
example, but there were others. The prospects of success were as limited then as they are 
now, and for similar reasons. One is that of asymmetric interests. Different nations have 
differing maritime priorities arising from their unique geographies, economies, histo-
ries, and political alignments. These differences make it difficult to reach agreement on 
mutually acceptable bilateral naval limitations. Another is that navies are not just war-
fighting organizations. They also have diplomatic and constabulary roles in peacetime, 
as well as war. In times of peace, warships are de facto mobile embassies, representing a 
people’s technology, skills, and values abroad. They also have national sovereignty roles, 
such as fisheries or law enforcement, that have few parallels in the other services. As 
instruments of foreign policy, naval forces can maneuver to send diplomatic signals in 
a way that armies and air forces cannot; there is a significant difference between a task 
force of warships cruising beyond the twelve-mile territorial limit and a division of tanks 
advancing to a point twelve miles from a land border. 
When disputes occur, warships are more than just blunt instruments with which govern-
ments can project or threaten use of force. International law and custom expects naval 
forces to be commanded and controlled by qualified and disciplined individuals, po-
tential contributors to positive, creative crisis management. For these reasons, maritime 
confidence building has generally been far more productive than structural naval arms 
control; not least because mariners of all nations share a common seagoing culture, one 
that helps to foster mutual understanding and facilitate dialogue.
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Confidence Building: The Maritime Heritage
Most literature on confidence building assumes that the idea began in the mid-1970s, 
with the introduction of the term “confidence-building measure” (CBM) during Cold 
War arms-control negotiations, in a continental European context. In fact, its history not 
only stretches back well before the advent of nuclear weapons but also has a significant 
maritime component. Formal and tacit agreements for the conduct of vessels at sea have 
been a norm on the world’s oceans from time immemorial. 
Commercial and Navigation Measures. Mariners, whether naval or civilian, have a long 
tradition of mutual understanding in ways that have few parallels ashore. Maritime 
commerce has traditionally sought a stable and secure environment in which to pursue 
commercial rivalries, while warships have long interacted in times of peace and have 
acted as instruments of national policy in roles other than combat. Modern commercial 
marine law has a lineage traceable to a code created on the island of Rhodes three thou-
sand years ago, just as well developed Indo-Pacific maritime trade had evolved its own 
body of customs of behavior on the other side of the globe.24 The earliest known source 
for modern maritime law is the familiar twelfth-century Rules of Oléron, but there were 
also earlier commercial sea laws in ancient Greece, in seventh- and eighth-century By-
zantium, and in the eleventh- and twelfth-century Italian city-states of Trani, Pisa, and 
Amalfi.25 Mariners worldwide have been complying since 1846 with collision-prevention 
procedures that originated with what were known as the Trinity House (of Montreal) 
rules. These evolved into rules jointly adopted by Britain and France in 1863 and by 
1864 had been adopted by over thirty countries, including the United States and Ger-
many. Today, the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea are binding on 
any vessel anywhere on the global ocean. Upon this foundation, a vast body of regulation 
and law of the sea has evolved, to the extent that the 1982 United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea has been described as a “constitution for the ocean.” This body of 
law is universally acknowledged, because that acknowledgment is mutually beneficial. 
It also provides a variety of technical forums in which all states can participate, whether 
hostile to each other or not. These face-to-face interactions between individual maritime 
professionals are, in themselves, an ongoing contribution to mutual understanding and 
mutual confidence.
Naval Measures. Even before the distinction between naval and merchant services 
became as sharp as it is today, agreements to promote confidence were established. In the 
year 1297, for example, King Edward I of England and Guy, count of Flanders, entered 
into an agreement “as to the Behaviour at Sea of English and Flemish Ships,” requir-
ing vessels to fly flags showing the coats of arms of their respective sovereigns, to avoid 
confusion, and agreeing to cooperate in law enforcement efforts at sea. 
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One of the earliest examples of a maritime military confidence-building measure in the 
modern sense was part of an arms-limitation agreement made in 1817. Surprisingly, it 
is still in force today. The arms-control aspect has long since become irrelevant, but the 
confidence-building aspect remains. The War of 1812 had resulted in a proliferation of 
warships on the Great Lakes, which straddle the national boundaries of Canada and the 
United States in the heart of North America. After the war, the 1817 Rush-Bagot Agree-
ment sought to assure mutual security by limiting the number of these warships. The 
exchange of notes constituting the agreement was preceded, in August 1816, by a mutu-
ally announced freeze on naval construction and an exchange of lists of naval forces 
maintained by each side. Today, this would be described as a constraint and informa-
tion-exchange CBM. The letter of this agreement has long since grown obsolete, after 
more than 190 years, but the spirit of transparency continues to be respected. Obviously 
the provision limiting both sides to vessels “not exceeding one hundred tons burthen 
and armed with one eighteen-pound cannon” was long ago exceeded, but the principle 
of dialogue has not been.26 Although Canada and the United States are now close allies 
and friends, the agreement was invoked by Canada when in the early 1960s the United 
States considered deploying ship- or submarine-launched ballistic missiles on the Great 
Lakes.27 More recently, it was the basis of bilateral dialogue in 2006, when the U.S. Coast 
Guard announced that it would mount machine guns on its cutters.28 
Treaties that contain what would now be called CBMs were created in Latin America in 
the early and middle twentieth century. The 1902 Pactos de Mayo (May Agreements) 
between Argentina and Chile contained elements that would today be described as  
information-exchange CBMs. In the 1920s the Pactos de Mayo served as a model for 
similar treaties in Europe.29 Similarly, the 1923 General Treaty of Peace and Amity estab-
lished a system of confidence-building information exchange in Central America.30
The long history of modern arms control, from the 1899 Hague Conference to the pres-
ent, has shown that attempting to limit armaments without also nurturing mutual confi-
dence becomes more a matter of bargaining for advantage than a means of reducing 
economically burdensome and potentially destabilizing armed rivalry. Fifty years before 
“confidence building” became a recognized concept, an American president, Warren 
Harding, said in his invitation to the Washington Conference, “It is, however, quite clear 
that there can be no final assurance of peace of the world in the absence of the desire 
for peace, and the prospect of reduced armaments is not a hopeful one unless this desire 
finds expression in a practical effort to remove the causes of misunderstanding and to 
seek ground for agreement as to principles and their application.”31 Harding’s “practical 
effort to remove the causes of misunderstanding” remains as good a working definition 
as any of what today would be called confidence building.
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Creating “Measures” or Transforming a Relationship?
In assessing any security relationship, even between the best of friends, the prudent 
analyst must consider two factors—capabilities and intentions. Arms control deals with 
the quantifiable technical issue of capabilities. Confidence building addresses the more 
difficult and subjective matter of intentions.
James Macintosh is a Canadian academic who, after many years of analyzing and 
categorizing confidence-building measures, has concluded that a focus on producing 
“measures” is misleading and can be counterproductive. It is the process that is really 
important. Too often, political leaders commit themselves to creating CBMs and then, 
if negotiations do not result in “measures,” are left to announce failure. Macintosh has 
argued for a “transformation view” of confidence building, as a matter undertaken by 
policy makers “with the minimum, explicit intention of improving at least some aspects 
of a suspicious and traditionally antagonistic security relationship.”32 Thus, effective 
confidence building should be focused not necessarily on producing a “measure” but 
rather on the dynamic process of transforming a security relationship from a flawed 
present to a more stable and less risky future.
It should be noted that successful relationships do not even need to rely on formal 
documentation. Mutual understanding and open channels of communication may suf-
fice. As Ken Booth has said about arms control, “A formal treaty is to arms control what 
marriage is to love: it dramatizes, formalizes, constrains and solidifies a relationship, but 
is by no means necessary for its realization.”33
A Case Study in Transformative Confidence Building
Collisions and Consequences
Incidents such as the 2001 EP-3/F-8 collision or 2009 Impeccable encounter may appear 
relatively minor to the uninitiated, but similar events in different circumstances can have 
disastrous consequences. An incident that occurred four decades ago illustrates just how 
serious that risk can be. 
In 1967, Soviet and American warships were operating in close proximity to each other 
in the Sea of Japan when, on two consecutive days, collisions occurred. What is signifi-
cant about these incidents is not so much that they happened—they only caused dents 
and damaged guardrails—but rather what resulted at the political level. Although the 
ships were acting in accordance with national policy direction, the collisions themselves 
were probably accidental. Like China’s navy today, the Soviet Navy in 1967 was expand-
ing rapidly from a coastal extension of the army to an oceangoing fleet worthy of a great 
power. In the Soviet case, many young commanding officers were relatively inexperi-
enced, especially in the challenging business of maneuvering ships at close quarters, 
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when momentary misjudgment and the laws of physics can combine to draw mov-
ing hulls together very quickly. Whether or not these collisions were an accident, they 
became a volatile political issue. In Washington, the House Republican leader (and later 
president), Gerald Ford, stated that future guidance to American commanding officers 
should include the possible use of weapons. Not unreasonably, the commander of the 
Soviet Navy, Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, responded, “It is not hard to imagine what might 
happen if warships were to begin shooting at each other when they collide.”34 
Catalyst for Confidence
The Sea of Japan incident had not been the first such episode, nor was it the last, but it 
did prompt a process of finding a better way to manage interaction at sea.35 Ultimately, 
the Soviet Union and United States engaged in a remarkably unconventional and 
creative process of mutual problem solving. The result was an innovative agreement, 
signed in 1972, that proved to be not only an excellent incident-management tool but 
also a catalyst for further practical cooperation.36 In addition, it served as an inspiration 
(if not always a specific model) for a wide variety of maritime safety agreements around 
the world (some of which are described in the appendix).37 The many lessons offered 
by these agreements can be (and are) the subject of entire seminars and workshops. For 
purposes of this discussion, however, the important point is that the prospect of a minor 
accident escalating into an act of war between nuclear powers was something that wor-
ried knowledgeable authorities then, just as it should worry decision makers in China 
and the United States now. Again—it is bad policy and in no one’s interest to perpetuate 
a relationship in which an innocent mistake at sea can trigger an unwanted political 
crisis.
From Confrontation to Comanagement
An excellent example of how the 1972 Soviet-U.S. arrangement allowed both govern-
ments to manage conflicting political objectives occurred in the Black Sea in 1988. Two 
U.S. warships, conducting what was known as a “Freedom of Navigation” operation, 
transited through the territorial sea of the Soviet Union off the Crimean Peninsula, 
claiming “innocent passage.” The Soviet government saw this as a deliberate “military 
provocation”; two Soviet warships intercepted and deliberately bumped into the U.S. 
ships. Little damage was done, and the predictable public statements were made by both 
governments. Nonetheless, four months later the annual consultation between navies 
took place, and there admirals from both sides were able to discuss the incident with 
remarkable “openness and frankness.” As a result, they were able to make recommenda-
tions to their respective governments that resulted one year later in a political agreement 
that in turn resolved the issue in a manner acceptable to both.38 
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There are several important lessons to be learned from the Black Sea incident, particu-
larly when it is contrasted to the futile 2009 Chinese-U.S. experience with USNS  
Impeccable.
The actions in 1988 on both sides were deliberate and conducted at the direction of  •
the highest levels in both governments. 
The diplomatic messages that naval forces were ordered to send were mutually under- •
stood, because they had been communicated clearly. 
Commanding officers on both sides were able to carry out the intents of their respec- •
tive governments correctly and safely, because they could communicate with each 
other directly as the situation unfolded.
Afterward, admirals from both navies, in the presence of advisers from the respective  •
foreign ministries, were able to discuss what happened and share professional mili-
tary background information that was otherwise unobtainable through diplomatic 
channels.
The postincident consultation facilitated government-to-government resolution of  •
the diplomatic issue that had prompted the event in the first place.
Unlike the Chinese-U.S. MMCA arrangement, the Soviet-U.S. maritime safety agree-
ment made a positive difference in transforming a relationship at sea from confrontation 
to comanagement.39 One of the most important features was that it made no attempt 
to resolve strategic and political problems. Rather, it focused on safe management of 
maritime operations whenever the respective maritime forces were implementing gov-
ernment policy—especially when those operations were necessarily confrontational. It 
enabled commanders on both sides to communicate intentions, resolve ambiguity, and 
clarify misunderstandings on the scene. Equally important, it enabled senior officers to 
consult frankly and openly after such events, allowing them to understand the issues in 
detail and to make appropriate recommendations to their respective governments. This 
experience and others like it around the world offer a variety of precedents and pros-
pects for innovative and tailor-made methods (or “sailor-made,” as one commentator 
puts it) of preventing, or at least mitigating the effects of, confrontational encounters at 
sea.40 
Adjusting Course
Desired End State
During an unlikely standoff in which Canadian and Spanish warships found themselves 
confronting each other over a fisheries dispute in 1994–95, and despite fiery political and 
media rhetoric on both sides, “a Canadian Admiral and his Spanish counterpart were 
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almost constantly in contact reviewing the situation and it was extremely unlikely that 
the two forces would have ever traded fire over the issue.”41 In fact, both admirals and the 
commanding officers of both ships knew each other personally, through NATO interac-
tion. This does not imply that anything was done contrary to government direction—on 
the contrary, it meant that both navies were able to implement the intended policies 
of their respective governments responsibly, safely, and without misunderstanding or 
mishap. Whatever political leaderships may be thinking, it is vital that their military sub-
ordinates share a professional relationship of mutual respect and understanding so that 
unintended consequences of military actions do not damage the national interest.
In the jargon of social science, those of all nationalities who go to sea can be described 
as an “epistemic community”—that is, a transnational group of specialists who share 
a common professional culture that transcends national or racial background. This 
is a particularly potent advantage of navy-to-navy relationships. The history of mari-
time confidence building is full of anecdotes about naval officers achieving levels of 
understanding almost unimaginable to diplomats, even to soldiers. After one very 
sensitive consultation following a serious incident between American and Soviet ships, 
for example, a State Department adviser to the subsequent navy-to-navy consultation 
reported that he was “utterly amazed at the frankness, professionalism, and objectivity 
of the exchanges during the sessions, in contrast to the normal diplomatic intercourse 
between the two countries.”42 That single comment encapsulates nicely the difference be-
tween proven navy-to-navy models and more traditional, politically oriented approaches 
like the MMCA. The seagoing culture of professional mariners and naval aviators is an 
invaluable asset to national governments, because it allows practical and technical mat-
ters of safety and predictability to be addressed without political posturing. This asset 
needs to be enabled, not impeded. 
In order to fulfill the mandate expressed by the two presidents in 2009 to improve and 
develop military-to-military relations, the U.S. and Chinese navies would do well to 
draw on this broad range of worldwide maritime confidence-building experience to 
create a joint strategy for achieving two goals. The first and fundamental goal would be 
to achieve better mutual understanding. The second, and more crucial for safety and se-
curity, would be to establish practical and robust mechanisms for relationship manage-
ment at sea.
Mutual Understanding 
Even when military professionals arrive in the same room and are ready to discuss issues 
frankly, openly, and honestly, there is still the challenge of language limitations.43 This 
is not just a matter of having good interpreters. Some ideas simply cannot be trans-
lated precisely from one language to another; experience has shown that when this is 
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not recognized and addressed, much confusion can follow. In English, for example, the 
word “security” has a different sense from “safety.” This distinction can be important: 
in a track-two Middle East forum some years ago, discussion of security issues had to 
be avoided because they were too sensitive to be allowed within the authorized “politi-
cal space” (as Dr. Peter Jones has called it), but the specifically humanitarian business of 
safety, such as marine search and rescue, was perfectly acceptable.44 In Chinese, the same 
word is customarily used to translate both concepts, the characters suggesting a more 
harmonious and less militant tone for “security” than in the common usage of Western 
militaries. That word, an quan, consists of two characters: an (meaning “peace”), the 
character for which combines the characters for “woman” and “roof,” and quan (mean-
ing “complete” or “perfect”), which combines the characters for “joined” and “work.” 
While an American may hear in the word “security” a robust sense of strong defense 
mechanisms, his or her Chinese counterpart might picture a more harmonious, home-
like environment in which defenses should be unnecessary. It is important to make 
the effort to explore these often subtle differences, because some can have operational 
implications. Again in a Middle East experience, difficulties once arose over use of the 
word “surveillance,” which in English describes a legitimate, overt activity but in Arabic 
translation carries the nefarious connotation of covert spying. 
We need to understand each other’s cultural paradigms if we are to communicate ef-
fectively. This is a sensitive issue that needs to be approached with caution, because 
differences can be overplayed as well as underestimated. Nonetheless, credible stud-
ies in cultural psychology have suggested significant differences between typical Asian 
and Western thought processes. Richard Nisbett, for example, has made a strong case 
that Western modes of thought, with their ancient Greek philosophical roots, tend to 
be linear, categorical, and analytical, while Asian approaches tend to be more cyclical, 
contextual, and holistic; that Westerners focus on contracts, while Asians value rela-
tionships; and that Westerners stress abstract reason, while Asians stress interpersonal 
reasonableness.45 If this is true, the implications for military-to-military dialogue need 
to be explored and understood. On the other hand, arguments for a unique “Asian Way” 
that is fundamentally different from Western thinking can be exaggerated and even 
exploited for political purposes. Our cultural modes of thought may be different, but we 
are all human. As the last British governor of Hong Kong has argued, “Decency is decent 
everywhere; honesty is true; courage is brave; wickedness is evil; the same ambitions, 
hopes and fears crowd around and result from similar experiences in every society.”46 
Understanding our differences and celebrating our common humanity is key to building 
resilient relationships that will be sustainable in stormy times as well as sunny periods.
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A Case Study in Culture and Language
The midair collision off Hainan in April 2001 marked the beginning of a tense period of 
what Peter Hays Gries and Kaiping Peng call “apology diplomacy,” which finally resulted 
in a peculiar letter from the U.S. ambassador saying that the president and secretary of 
state were “sorry” for the loss of the pilot and that the EP-3 had entered Chinese airspace 
and landed without verbal clearance. The president and secretary of state then made it 
abundantly clear publicly that this letter did not imply any acknowledgment of Ameri-
can fault. Meanwhile, the incident had generated a political storm in both countries, 
leading—in the United States, for example—to debates over issues ranging from the 
scale of future arms sales to Taiwan to support for China’s accession to the World Trade 
Organization.47
Reviewing what both sides said about the incident illustrates the misperception chal-
lenge well.48 The United States was conducting what any Western nation would recog-
nize as overt surveillance but in Chinese eyes was perfidious spying. To Americans it was 
obvious that the aircraft was in legal airspace, since international law does not prohibit 
military flights over an exclusive economic zone (EEZ), but Chinese held that the United 
States was hypocritically violating the spirit, if not the letter, of the law in that it has an 
air defense identification zone off its own coast extending well beyond its own EEZ. 
The United States objected strenuously to China’s claim of the right to examine the 
crippled EP-3 in Hainan, while Chinese noted that when a Soviet defector flew a MiG-25 
into Japan in 1976, technicians from the U.S. Air Force Foreign Technology Division 
dismantled the aircraft and returned it in packing crates.49 The almost universal focus in 
the United States was on the issue of air-to-air interceptions and previously recorded ex-
perience with this particular Chinese pilot, who this time had made a fatal mistake that 
had resulted in an American crew being held hostage for the sake of a hollow, face-saving 
apology. Chinese discourse was more contextual, seeing this incident as just one of many 
aspects of a long U.S. pattern of intelligence gathering and intimidation in the air and 
on the sea, stretching back to humiliating gunboat diplomacy in the nineteenth century. 
The American discourse was full of commentary on the perfidy and hegemonic ambi-
tions of China. Chinese discourse was full of commentary on the perfidy and hegemonic 
ambitions of the United States. In fact, as Gries and Peng have argued, both sides were 
making equally valid arguments within their own cultural contexts but also exhibiting 
many cultural similarities. The important lesson, they point out, is that “a Sino-American 
relationship devoid of mutual trust becomes a volatile powder keg. Once ‘they’ cease to 
be human, the psychological foundation for violence is laid.”50 
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Robust Practical Mechanisms
Although the MMCA contains nothing that would have helped once the EP-3/F-8 situ-
ation began to develop, the incident could have been avoided through good airmanship 
and adherence to existing procedures. There is, after all, lot of global experience with air-
to-air interceptions and even an international manual governing the interception of civil 
aircraft, the principles of which would presumably be equally applicable to a military 
transport or reconnaissance aircraft.51 Nonetheless, had a robust situation management 
arrangement been in place, a more precise and positive tool would have been available 
to prevent the incident or, if that had failed, to contribute to crisis resolution in the short 
term and improved “military maritime safety” in the longer term. 
What difference might it have made if, instead of the MMCA, China and the United 
States had already created an arrangement that drew on some of the innovative elements 
that the United States found so successful and others emulated during and after the Cold 
War?
The pilots did not communicate other than by hand signals from the Chinese pilot,  •
the meaning of which were unclear to American crew. An agreement that had in-
cluded provision for real-time communication would have provided working radio 
frequencies, call signs, and codes to bridge the language barrier and express intentions 
or concerns.
Neither operational headquarters ashore was able to relay real-time incident-resolution  •
messages through national authorities to the other nation. With a more practical ar-
rangement in place, at very least there could have been urgent communication using 
established channels.
After the incident was over, there was no forum for, or tradition of, candid consulta- •
tion in which the facts of the case could be laid on the table so that both sides could 
establish, privately and without political posturing, what had happened and how to 
prevent it from happening again. With a more robust and cooperative arrangement, 
an annual or specially convened consultation could have done just that. 
It is interesting to note that the unconvincing accusations against the American pilot—
it seems clear that the immediate cause of collision was pilot error on the part of the 
interceptor—all appear to have originated from China’s civilian diplomatic community 
rather than from the defense establishment, suggesting political posturing rather than 
factual analysis.52 It would seem that the military professionals would have had no 
problem going behind closed doors and taking a mutual approach to incident and risk 
management.
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Getting from Here to There
The military is an instrument of the state, custodian of the national armory, and steward 
of some of the government’s most sensitive security concerns. Furthermore, in most 
advanced societies, it is firmly subordinate to civilian leadership. Consequently, any 
suggestion of an independent role can (and should) be viewed with justifiable suspicion 
in political and diplomatic circles. Before any substantive navy-to-navy dialogue can 
take place, therefore, the respective political authorities must not only grant permission 
but also become confident that the interaction will be a substantial asset to the national 
security interest. Fortunately, that is not a difficult case to make, since unintended inci-
dents between armed forces are clearly not in anyone’s national interest. The business of 
government is to manage events and minimize risk; no political leader wants a situation 
where an honest misjudgment by a junior officer at sea may create a counterproductive 
international political problem at an inopportune moment. The challenge, therefore, is 
for political leaders to understand the unique nature and advantages of frank and open 
mutual problem solving and then to define the “political space” within which naval pro-
fessionals are free to deal with technical matters candidly and honestly. A fundamental 
lesson from more than thirty-five years of worldwide experience in developing maritime 
situation management mechanisms is that political posturing has no place inside a pro-
fessional incident-management forum.
Experience suggests that the current MMCA is inadequate for effective incident manage-
ment at sea. The process of refining or replacing it would be an excellent starting point 
for transforming the overall naval military-to-military relationship. Giving careful 
thought to prevailing paradigms, learning relevant lessons from worldwide experience in 
maritime situation management, and revisiting the issue in a spirit of mutual problem 
solving could do much to enhance mutual confidence and security. 
Transforming the Maritime Military-to-Military Relationship 
The commanders and crews of the Chinese and American ships and aircraft that interact 
and sometimes confront each other at sea are decent, honest, and professional people, 
but tactical-level accidents and mishaps can happen to the best of them. Such events 
should not plunge political leaders into unexpected state-to-state confrontation for lack 
of a robust and effective situation-management mechanism. 
The Human Element
In international relations, the human element is fundamentally important, and mutual 
misunderstanding is one of the greatest risks. Reducing misperception is a core function 
of state-to-state confidence building, and that is something with which sailors have had 
centuries of experience. The best example of a modern confidence-building measure is 
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the concept of navy-to-navy agreements for prevention of incidents at sea—an innova-
tive, resilient, adaptable, and proven mechanism that has been adopted and adapted to a 
wide variety of circumstances (summarized in the appendix). Successful examples have 
transformed relationships from uncertainty and suspicion to understanding and clarity. 
The shared professional culture of the international naval community offers a power-
ful opportunity to improve security relationships between nations. For this to happen, 
however, there are three stages to consider.  
Political leadership must understand that navy-to-navy interaction is in its own best  •
interest, not a security threat, and then grant its military experts sufficient “political 
space” to conduct their professional, technical business free of political posturing. 
The military professionals must develop a common understanding of their differing  •
languages and cultures so that communication is clear and mutual understanding is 
achieved. 
This process should, and can, lead to a fundamental transformation of the relation- •
ship—not necessarily of political policies but certainly of how professional armed 
forces implement those policies to achieve the political intent. Both governments 
should be confident that they can order their respective maritime forces to implement 
national policy with the assurance that any interaction at sea, whether cooperative or 
confrontational, will be conducted in a consistently safe, professional, and predictable 
manner.
Practical Steps
The Military Maritime Consultative Agreement between the United States and China 
was a good start on confidence building but is, in its present form, an inadequate mea-
sure for managing events. It does not contain relationship-transforming elements that 
could make it far more relevant and useful. After twelve years, numerous incidents, and 
one death, it is time to reevaluate it in the light of other experience worldwide so that it 
better serves the interests of both parties. With the right “political space” and a commit-
ment to better mutual understanding, the two great nations can transform their security 
relationship at sea for the better. 
It is in the interest of the governments of both China and the United States to comanage 
interaction between their military forces at sea in a manner that is safe and minimizes 
the chances of unintended political consequences. This is particularly important at times 
when policies and positions differ, such as the dispute over the operations of USNS Im-
peccable off Hainan. In contrast, the Black Sea incident twenty-one years earlier showed 
that it is possible for nations to use naval forces to send political signals to each other 
in a professional, safe, and controlled manner. Not only that, but it is also possible to 
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enable such negative confrontations to be transformed into positive results. Experience 
elsewhere has shown that for this to become possible, the governments of China and the 
United States would do well to pursue two parallel paths toward a transformed relationship.
Improve mutual understanding to make each side’s military professionals more aware  •
of the other’s interests, motives, and concerns. 
Delegate sufficient and appropriate authority to specified military officials to enable  •
them to establish professional, robust, resilient, and simple government-to-government 
mechanisms for communication, cooperation, and consultation at all levels, from the 
tactical to the strategic.
Mutual understanding can be advanced both by academic expert workshops and by 
appropriate technical and professional navy-to-navy exchanges. The China Maritime 
Studies Institute at the U.S. Naval War College is already creating nonpolitical academic 
opportunities, and it is to be hoped that more such initiatives will be pursued by both 
countries. 
Professional maritime safety comanagement can only be achieved if governments del-
egate appropriate authority to maritime professionals so that they can deal directly with 
their counterparts on technical matters. Experience has shown that this works best when 
delegations are led by naval officers, with diplomats serving as advisers to a military 
head. Military-to-military frankness, professionalism, and objectivity are ideals toward 
which the governments of China and the United States would do well to strive.
Conclusion
Wishful thinking will not reduce policy differences between two great powers such as 
China and the United States. It is likely that legitimate disagreements will occasionally 
be expressed at sea by warships and maritime air forces used as instruments of national 
policy. Discussions over legalities are important, but, just as in marriage, though the law 
may help to define limits to behavior, it is not the only element necessary for a stable and 
constructive relationship. The ultimate aim of legal argument is to come to an arrange-
ment that both can accept. Meanwhile, however, operations are going on at sea continu-
ously, and even as these words are being read an accident or misunderstanding may be 
happening at the tactical level that will have serious, even disastrous consequences. It 
should be a political imperative to comanage these interactions safely and in a manner 
that the respective governments desire, not leaving them to chance and improvisation. 
A difficult situation that develops at sea is no time to cease communication in order to 
signal displeasure. On the contrary, it is the very time when communication becomes 
most vitally important; otherwise both parties risk losing control over events and hav-
ing to deal with unwanted consequences. The existing Military Maritime Consultative 
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Agreement is a good start, but even if it had included provisions for real-time commu-
nication, it would not have helped much in subsequent real-world incidents—and “if it 
does not work in adversity then it’s not worth the paper it’s written on.”53  
Two great naval powers like China and the United States need to create a much more 
comprehensive, robust, and effective military maritime safety-comanagement arrange-
ment that will continue to work no matter how tense any future situation might become. 
A wide range of positive experience and good examples is available from around the 
world. There is nothing to lose and much to gain from drawing on that experience now, 
before a simple misunderstanding, mistake, or accident creates a problem that neither 
government intends or wants. 
Appendix: Maritime Incident Management Arrangements Worldwide
Arguably one of the most successful of all confidence-building measures (CBMs) has 
been the 1972 agreement for prevention of incidents at sea (INCSEA) between the 
United States and the then Soviet Union. It is one of the most enduring and resilient of 
CBMs, still in force today after more than thirty-five years. Furthermore, the nature of 
this bilateral agreement is so demonstrably successful that it has been adopted, adapted, 
and made the inspiration for a wide variety of bilateral and multilateral arrangements 
(of varying effectiveness) worldwide. 
The author and his colleague Dr. Peter Jones, of the University of Ottawa, have been 
involved with a number of the examples described here and have been researching the 
issues and conducting seminars and consultations worldwide for more than a decade, 
including in Shanghai, China, in October 2007. By far the best description of the original 
U.S.-USSR agreement and some of the subsequent variations is David F. Winkler’s 
Preventing Incidents at Sea: The History of the INCSEA Concept (Halifax, N.S.: Dalhousie 
University, Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, 2008). It is a reprint of his earlier U.S. Na-
val Institute book entitled Cold War at Sea: High Seas Confrontation between the United 
States and the Soviet Union, with the addition of a new preface by the author and an 
afterword by Griffiths and Jones describing some of the post–Cold War derivatives.
The list below outlines some of the variations on the theme that have been created 
around the world. Not all resulted in formally signed agreements, but most at least 
increased mutual understanding and helped to reduce misperceptions.
USSR/Russia and Others. The original 1972 United States–Soviet Union INCSEA  •
prototype was adapted by eleven other nations to establish navy-to-navy dialogue 
with the Soviet Union and later Russia. Significantly, some of these, such as those 
with Japan and South Korea, were negotiated and signed after the Cold War was over 
(1993 and 1994, respectively). There were a number of reasons for this. In part it was 
because negotiations were already under way. Also, continuing political uncertainty 
made establishing navy-to-navy links a prudent step. In almost all cases, however, in 
addition to the immediate advantage of improved safety, it was the attractiveness of 
having mandatory annual consultations that provided a nonpolitical avenue to en-
hance mutual understanding. As mutual confidence increased and incidents declined, 
the concept of “staff talks” developed, adding informal discussions on matters of 
mutual interest to the formal consultations. This demonstrates how the value of the 
concept is much more subtle and useful than mere conflict prevention. The rationale 
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and process are described by one of the senior negotiators in Yoji Koda, “The Emerg-
ing Republic of Korea Navy: A Japanese Perspective,” Naval War College Review 63, no. 
2 (Spring 2010), pp. 13–34, available at www.usnwc.edu/press.  
Poland/West Germany. An agreement similar in wording to the INCSEA model was  •
also concluded between Poland and West Germany as the Cold War was ending in 
1990.
Greece and Turkey. The U.S.-USSR agreement was inspiration for a 1983 memoran- •
dum of understanding and subsequent Guidelines for the Prevention of Accidents 
and Incidents on the High Seas and International Airspace between Greece and 
Turkey. Although lacking the real-time tactical communications and annual consulta-
tion provisions of the prototype, this arrangement did illustrate the virtue of creative 
thinking in addressing specific mutual problems, by agreement to be particularly 
diligent about incident avoidance during the peak tourist season. 
Middle East. INCSEA was one of two elements in the maritime dimension of the  •
Middle East Peace Process in 1993–95, the other being cooperative search and rescue. 
Although the operational experts were able to achieve a mutually acceptable draft 
agreement, the political process collapsed before it could be submitted for political-
level consideration. Nonetheless, the effort was not wasted, because the process had 
brought former combatants together in a three-year process of joint problem solving 
that did much to improve mutual understanding, as well as to lay foundations for 
some discreet cooperation at sea that continued long after the political environment 
had again become confrontational. The process is described by Dr. Peter Jones, “Mari-
time Confidence Building in Regions of Tension,” in Maritime Confidence-Building 
Measures in the Middle East, ed. Jill R. Junnola, Report 21 (Washington, D.C.: Henry 
L. Stimson Center, May 1996), pp. 57–73.
Middle East and North Africa. Even though the peace process ended in the mid- •
1990s, momentum was maintained in maritime confidence-building dialogue 
through a Maritime Safety Colloquium for Middle East and North African naval 
and coast guard officers, plus others with maritime safety mandates. This process 
was managed by the Canadian Coast Guard, with the U.S. Coast Guard as an active 
partner, demonstrating the methodologies and benefits of mutual cooperation in 
maritime safety. Until the process lost momentum for bureaucratic reasons after 
2004, it succeeded in establishing a network of alumni from almost all Arab states, 
including Iraq, and from Israel. The story is described by Dalia Dassa Kaye in Talking 
to the Enemy: Track Two Diplomacy in the Middle East and South Asia (Santa Monica, 
Calif.: RAND, 2007), pp. 45–46.
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UN and CSCE Multilateral Proposals. In 1989, Sweden submitted a working paper  •
to the UN Disarmament Commission proposing a multilateral agreement for the 
prevention of incidents at sea. Nothing came of it for a number of reasons, mostly 
related to the difficulties inherent in a multilateral arrangement’s unsuitability for 
dealing with sensitive bilateral issues. Russia made a similar proposal to the Confer-
ence on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in 1990, but that too went 
nowhere, for similar reasons.
Western Pacific. The Western Pacific Naval Symposium produced a multilateral Code  •
for Unalerted Encounters at Sea (CUES) in 2000. It incorporates elements of the 
original INCSEA wording but goes far beyond the classic simplicity of a straightfor-
ward incident-avoidance mechanism by adding tactical maneuvering and signaling 
instructions, reproducing elements of NATO procedures that were declassified after 
the Cold War to encourage cooperative multinational maritime operations among 
like-minded states. The effectiveness of this hybrid approach remains to be analyzed 
in the public domain.
Malaysia and Indonesia. Because of the same limitations on multilateral arrange- •
ments that the Swedish proposal encountered, Malaysia and Indonesia found it 
necessary to supplement the multilateral CUES process with the parallel development 
of their own bilateral MALINDO (Malaysia-Indonesia) Prevention of Incidents at 
Sea Cooperative Guidelines. This was signed by the respective naval commanders in 
Jakarta in 2001. More complex than the classic INCSEA model but much simpler and 
more focused than CUES, this arrangement is an interesting example of a carefully 
staffed and functional adaptation of the INCSEA concept to address very different 
specific circumstances.
India and Pakistan. In 1999 the foreign ministers of India and Pakistan signed a  •
memorandum of understanding in Lahore to “conclude an agreement on prevention 
of incidents at sea in order to ensure safety of navigation by naval vessels, and aircraft 
belonging to the two sides.” While little happened on the official front, academic stud-
ies by retired senior officers from both countries (some of whom were former chiefs 
of naval staff) enabled officials on both sides to better understand the principles, 
practice, and international experience in detail. (See Dalhousie University, Centre 
for Foreign Policy Studies, “Confidence and Cooperation in South Asian Waters,” 
available at centreforforeignpolicystudies.dal.ca/events/marsec_CCSAW.php.) Official 
negotiations were reportedly ongoing before the 2008 attack on Mumbai by Pakistani 
extremists interrupted official dialogue. 
China and the United States. The 1998 Agreement between the Department of  •
Defense of the United States of America and the Ministry of National Defense of the 
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People’s Republic of China on Establishing a Consultation Mechanism to Strengthen 
Military Maritime Safety—or Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA)—
was much more diplomatic in nature and tone than the classic INCSEA model, 
minimizing the role of operational experts and containing no provision for real-time 
tactical communication, as was to be tragically highlighted by the 2001 midair colli-
sion off Hainan. While annual meetings are useful to discuss incidents, they are not 
much help when events are unfolding rapidly on, over, or under the sea.
Dangerous Military Activities Agreements. In addition to these naval-oriented ar- •
rangements, the INCSEA experience also inspired several examples of broader bilat-
eral dialogue involving all branches of the armed forces, called “dangerous military 
activities agreements” (DMAAs). This demonstrates how—as is often the case in 
confidence building—maritime initiatives offer opportunities to create new prece-
dents in an arena that is governed by long tradition and established law of the sea and 
is therefore often less sensitive than along land boundaries.
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